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The concept of a policy legacy has come into widespread use among schol-
ars in history and the social sciences, yet the concept has not been subject to
close scrutiny. We suggest that policy legacies tend to underexplain outcomes
and minimize conventional politics and historical contingencies. These ten-
dencies are evident in the revisionist literature on American politics in the
aftermath of the First World War. That work stresses continuities between
wartime mobilization and postwar policy, especially under the auspices of
Herbert Hoover and the Commerce Department. We maintain that a rupture
marks the transition between the war and the Republican era that followed
and that the emphasis on wartime legacies distorts the political realities of
the Harding–Coolidge era. We conclude by noting the risks of policy legacy
approaches in historical analysis.
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tionalism.
INTRODUCTION: LEGACIES THICK AND THIN
Policy history scholars refer often to the idea of a policy legacy to help
explain the durability or recurrence of policy patterns. The term “legacy”
connotes something that has been handed down from one generation to
another, an inheritance. Later generations of policy makers will look to the
past as they try to grasp problems or seek lessons about success and failure;
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existing laws, agencies, and personnel remain as the tangible material from
which new policy will be fashioned. The likelihood that a policy inheritance
will continue to shape subsequent policy outcomes is magnified, moreover,
by a decision sequence that makes other courses of action less imaginable.
Once a choice is made early in the development of a policy, that choice will
“advantage” similar alternatives at the next decision stage, and the similar
choices in turn will make like decisions less costly and more attractive in the
future.1 Path dependence, an analytically distinct concept, thus facilitates
the transmission of a policy legacy.
For scholars of policy development, the notion of a policy legacy has as-
sumed a range of meanings. Some treat the concept as narrow and concrete,
yet note that even in such a strictly limited sense it can have considerable
explanatory force. Thus Richard Rose and Phillip L. Davies observe that
any incoming government begins not from scratch but with a welter of laws,
organizations, and permanent state personnel, most of which it cannot pos-
sibly hope to change.2 Other scholars construe the notion of a policy bequest
more broadly or relax the assumption of direct policy continuity over time.
It may make sense to speak of a legacy as an ongoing discourse embracing a
common policy approach, even where that approach does not find practical
expression at any given moment. Legacy here assumes the form of certain
conventions about how to understand policy challenges and the means by
which they should be addressed. When examining discursive legacies, schol-
ars may focus less on what governments and state personnel do than on the
role of nongovernmental organizations and actors seeking to shape policy.
Alternatively, the inheritance from the past may be negative or exclusion-
ary, an enduring set of policy constraints that reemerge time and again to
limit policy choices. In the context of modern American public policy, for
example, the limitations imposed by liberal notions of limited government,
by persistent anti-statist attitudes, or by a fragmented federal institutional
system may have pushed policy makers to adopt similar responses.3
The various meanings of policy legacy, moreover, are not mutually
exclusive. Different kinds of inheritance—formal organizations, discursive
themes, and extra-state networks—may be woven together to constitute a
“thick legacy” of practical policy innovations and dominant ideas that effec-
tively crowd out other policy approaches. (We coin the term “thick legacy” to
reflect multiple lines of transmission across time; the term is not intended to
evoke or parallel concepts like “thick description” that have gained currency
in various social science disciplines.) Thick legacy accounts bear promise of
providing robust explanations of policy outcomes. Where discursive or con-
straining legacies leave space for other, more immediate causal influences
to manifest themselves, thick legacies appear to comprise every necessary
link in a causal chain. There is no need to look further.
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Although a useful tool in historical analysis, policy legacy is a concept
scholars employ at some risk. In the first place, legacy may be defined so
loosely that it can be invoked at the mere reappearance of a policy orien-
tation at different points in time. Since we can identify antecedents for any
policy idea or innovation, the episodic reiteration of a policy approach by
itself has no explanatory value and ought not to be treated as evidence of
a legacy. Even with more restrictive definitions that presuppose identifiable
lines of transmission, the emphasis on policy legacy may account for too
little. Systemic constraints operate typically as boundary or limiting condi-
tions that influence outcomes only in the rare moments when political actors
appear ready to consider solutions that fall outside the normal range of pol-
icy options. To account for most choices, then, the analysis of constraints
tells us little. At the other extreme lie thick legacy accounts that embrace
all lines of continuity between two points, yet still distort our understanding
because of what is excluded. The stress on antecedents and carryovers yields
a policy history that is too neat. It can ignore political forces that lie outside
the development path and overlook the odd twists and turns of history, the
accidents and tricks of fate, that cannot be made to fit the story. The limits
and pitfalls of the policy legacy concept prompt us to interrogate it, lest it
assume a taken-for-granted status that may be corrosive of good scholarship.
As a vehicle through which to advance our critique, we offer a histor-
ical case study that reconsiders the place of associationalism in American
national politics in the early 1920s. The period invites a discussion of the
policy legacy framework because revisionist scholars have identified various
types of legacies in the patterns of business-government cooperation extend-
ing from the First World War to the Great Depression and the New Deal. At
the center of most such accounts stands Herbert Hoover, an energetic pro-
ponent of voluntary business-government planning to meet a range of social
problems, first as commerce secretary and later as president. We challenge
the legacy perspectives by offering an alternative account of the Harding-
Coolidge era that emphasizes the minimal continuity between the war period
and the Republican-dominated postwar years and underscores the limited
and largely accidental nature of Hoover’s policy successes. The story of the
1920s is much more one of intra- and interpartisan conflict than of an emerg-
ing policy consensus in support of associationalism. Partisan politics initially
stalled the associationalist agenda in the Harding years and then facilitated
its very modest advance under the Coolidge administration. Such success
as Hoover and his allies enjoyed, moreover, owed much to chance, not to
the appeal of their ideas or the power of their network. Our analysis makes
clear that no thick legacy connects policy in the 1920s to earlier wartime
experiments in business-government cooperation. Further, although we do
not doubt the existence of thin discursive or systemic constraint legacies, we
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suggest that it would be an error to place much weight on them as an expla-
nation for the pattern of policy outcomes during the Harding-Coolidge era.
We maintain it is more productive to start with the partisan context shaped
by a splintered Republican regime.
To set the stage for our retelling of the place of associationalism in the
early 1920s, we begin with a brief review of revisionist arguments that con-
nect the period to what came before and what followed. The different ways
scholars construe the legacy idea all find expression in the revisionist litera-
ture, ranging from accounts that trace a thick legacy in policies, personnel,
and policy conventions from the First World War through the New Deal to
others that claim only ongoing conversations about new policy approaches.
We then offer, in the following three sections, our alternative narrative of
the early interwar period, in which we show just how tenuous the appeal of
associationalism was. That appeal rested not on a war-generated association-
alist legacy, but instead on other political forces and on historical accidents
the legacy framework does not accommodate. To develop our alternative
account of the early interwar period, we first recall the sharp policy rupture
that marked the return of full Republican control in 1921 and the partisan
context political actors like Hoover would have to negotiate. We next explore
the opposition to associationalist innovations from political actors and insti-
tutions that did not share the enthusiasm for corporatist policy approaches.
Although the pieces of this story have been presented before, we retell it
to make plain Hoover’s very modest initial impact on policy. The greater
success he enjoyed under Coolidge, we indicate in the final substantive sec-
tion, reflected a combination of chance happenings and partisan calculation
by the president that hardly suggests the power of an associationalist policy
legacy. We conclude by examining the analytical implications of the case for
the concept of a policy legacy.
POLICY INNOVATION FROM THE GREAT WAR TO THE NEW
DEAL: REVISIONISM AS THE NEW ORTHODOXY
Revisionist accounts of the American political development from the
First World War through the 1920s have dramatically altered the picture
of that era that was drawn by the first generation of scholars writing un-
der the influence of the New Deal. The older view depicted the 1920s as
a sterile interlude of prosperity in which political leaders ignored festering
social problems, culminating in Herbert Hoover’s allegedly passive reaction
to the Great Depression. From this perspective, the New Deal represented a
fundamental break with what had come before, a period of remarkable pol-
icy innovation and political reconstruction.4 Another interpretation of the
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postwar era emerges, though, from the seminal work of Ellis Hawley and the
recent efforts of other historians and political scientists. The revisionist litera-
ture draws a new picture of the 1920s as an era of corporatist policy ferment
and experimentation. Of particular significance, the national government
developed close ties with the private sector, especially trade associations,
to achieve a set of economic ends—to promote long-term growth and sta-
ble profits, reduce waste in production, and mitigate severe fluctuations in
the business cycle. Even the failures of associationalism contributed to later
policy development by revealing the deficit of public authority that charac-
terized the first ventures in business-government cooperation. Corporatist
governing arrangements became the policy tool of choice for dealing with
the Great Depression and were carried forward by the Roosevelt adminis-
tration into the New Deal, especially via the National Industrial Recovery
Act and the National Recovery Administration.5
Among revisionist scholars, the years between the Great War and the
New Deal yielded different kinds of policy legacies. One view stresses the
discursive carryover from the proponents of associationalism in the 1920s to
the architects of the New Deal. In the aftermath of the war, policy advocates
in government, the private sector, and intellectual circles recognized the
need for planning and public-private cooperation to overcome the uncer-
tainty of the marketplace. Hawley first called attention to the creative policy
thought centered on Herbert Hoover and the Commerce Department. Al-
though Hoover tried to implement associationalist ideas during his years as
commerce secretary, his tenure there had a greater impact on how political
and business leaders, economists, and others understood the weaknesses of
a modern capitalist economy and how these might be addressed through
some form of collective action.6
A second view identifies systemic constraints as the enduring legacy of
the 1920s. Colin Gordon carefully outlines the market conditions that made
for widespread instability across industries and notes the failure of many
business sectors, even with government backing, to overcome a fragmented
political system and their own collective action problems in their quest to
rationalize economic conditions. Sectoral instabilities and the collapse of
voluntary remedies set the stage for the New Deal.7 For David Hamilton,
the reliance upon voluntary approaches to policy challenges reflected sys-
temic limits arising from the American constitutional order and reinforced
by enduring American values. He, too, singles out federalism as a culprit,
but he adds that constitutional obstacles to government interference with
property contributed to the appeal of associationalism.8
If many of the revisionist accounts claim modest bequests from the
1920s to the New Deal, at least one tries to build a case for a thick legacy with
greater explanatory power. Marc Eisner asserts a striking degree of policy
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continuity from the First World War through the New Deal and beyond.9
Drawing explicitly upon the policy legacy concept, he anchors his account in
“historical inheritance—that is, how existing policy tools, models of adminis-
tration, and patterns of state-economy relations empowered and constrained
policy makers.”10 New Deal policy makers looked to previous innovations
in government-supervised self-regulation by private economic actors, rather
than to untried direct government planning. The recovery program intro-
duced by the Roosevelt administration reflected practices dating to First
World War mobilization that had evolved through the 1920s. During the
war the War Department, unable to direct mass mobilization, secured the
cooperation of private interests by delegating authority and providing ma-
terial benefits. In this manner an interventionist, “quasi-corporatist” state
was legitimized in the eyes of public officials, business leaders, and others.11
Associationalist practices spread after the war into several policy areas, in-
cluding business regulation, labor relations, agriculture, and macroeconomic
policy, thanks largely to the efforts of Hoover at Commerce and his acolytes
in other federal departments.12 Only later, amid the economic collapse of
the Great Depression, would the limitations of this kind of state—its ten-
uous foundation in economic self-interest and prosperity—become visible.
Yet even then, the effects of the path chosen, however ineffective, would
continue to limit the possible courses of action available to policy makers.13
In response to the revisionist accounts of the early interwar period, two
questions naturally arise. First, do they lead to a better understanding of the
New Deal era? Much of the revisionist work, as we noted, takes issue with
the earlier and still influential view that the Democrats from 1933 onward
ushered in a new political and policy order. Second, do revisionist works offer
us the best framework for understanding the period between the First World
War and the onset of the Great Depression in 1929? It is to this question that
we turn our attention here. The thick legacy version in particular purports
to be a full account of the 1920s—policy making throughout this period
can best be seen as an elaboration on wartime corporatist innovations, with
many of the same actors involved and significant continuity in programs and
institutions, as well as in the intellectual realm. Such an interpretation would
become untenable, however, were we to find sharp policy shifts after the war,
termination of wartime agencies without direct successors, displacement of
wartime administrative leadership, indifference or significant opposition to
associationalist schemes among political leaders, and a decrease in the rate
of trade group formation. The failure of a thick legacy analysis would still
leave space for other accounts that point to more modest legacies. Yet by
their very nature, discursive and systemic constraint legacies appear too
limited to stand alone as primary explanations for the broad pattern of policy
outcomes generated by the central national policymaking institutions (the
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presidency, Congress, and the Supreme Court) in a normal political period.
To understand what happened in the 1920s, then, we need to restore these
institutions to the foreground of the story.
ASSOCIATIONALISM AND REGIME POLITICS AFTER
THE GREAT WAR
We begin our recapitulation of the postwar policy story with the reestab-
lishment of a narrow Republican majority in Congress in the 1918 midterm
election and the landslide Republican victories in the 1920 presidential and
congressional contests. For the Republicans, these triumphs seemed to re-
store the natural political order that had been disrupted by the Wilson inter-
regnum. Dominant partisan coalitions, as the Republicans had been since
1896, regard the interruptions in their control as historical accidents that
confer little legitimacy on the actions taken by the opposition.14 Republi-
can leaders in the postwar period firmly believed that the Democrats had
held power only because of the division within Republican ranks between
Progressives and the stand-pat forces of the Old Guard. In more immedi-
ate terms, Republicans took their 1920 gains to be the final repudiation of
Wilsonian policies, most notably the president’s rigid defense of the League
of Nations and the administration’s failure to manage postwar economic
dislocation and domestic turmoil.15
Viewed from a 1921 vantage point, we are hard put to find evidence
of a thick associationalist legacy emerging from the wartime experience.
Experiments in business-government cooperation during the Great War
were badly tainted in the eyes of Republicans by their association with
the partisan opposition. When the Republicans returned to power, they did
not think of themselves as carrying forward the mobilization innovations,
but rather as undoing what the Democrats had left in place.16 Republicans
were eager to weaken the governing structures that had empowered trade
unions and, in their view, tilted the natural balance of power between cap-
ital and labor too far in the direction of the latter; to reduce the excessive
taxes the Democrats had enacted for the war but then had left in place; to
limit American involvement abroad; and more.17 One of the first acts by
the Republican congressional majority in 1919–1920 was to dismantle the
wartime railroad labor relations structure. The Republican alternative, as
Ruth O’Brien points out, marked a fundamental break with the corporatist
approach the Democrats favored.18 This move fit a larger pattern of parti-
san action: as indicated by Table 1, very few wartime administrative bodies
survived the return of Republican control. Only where the Democrats them-
selves had started to “unbuild” their wartime state, as in the case of Treasury
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Table 1. The Fate of Wartime Mobilization Agencies
Agency Postwar development
War Industries Board Abolished, January 1919. Some staff transferred
to Commerce Department
U. S. Food Administration Terminated operations, early 1920
U. S. Fuel Administration Dismantled, March 1919
U. S. Railroad Administration Ceased operations with passage of 1920
Transportation Act, which returned railroads
to private ownership
U. S. Shipping Board Emergency
Fleet Corporation
Continued through 1920s
War Finance Corporation Continued through 1920s to provide credit to
farmers, with reduced scope after 1924
Capital Issues Committee Terminated operations, December 1918
National War Labor Board Dismantled, June 1919. Railroad Labor Board
created under the Transportation Act to
handle arbitration
War Labor Policies Board Ceased operations, May 1919
Sources: Congressional Record, vol.65, 66; Robert Cuff, “Harry Garfield, the Fuel Administra-
tion, and the Search for a Cooperative Order During World War I,” in Robert F. Himmelberg,
ed., Business–Government Cooperation, 1917–1932: the Rise of Corporatist Policies (New York:
Garland Publishing, 1994); Robert Cuff, “United States Mobilization and Railroad Trans-
portation: Lessons in Coordination and Control, 1917–1945” in Himmelberg, ed. Business–
Government Cooperation, 1917–1932 ; Mark A. Eisner, From the Warfare State to Welfare State:
World War I: Compensatory State Building and the Limits of the Modern Order (University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000): Robert Himmelberg, “The War Indus-
tries Board and the Antitrust Question in November 1918,” Journal of American History 52
(June 1965): 59–74.
Department tax proposals to lower business tax rates, did the incoming Re-
publicans adopt Democratic initiatives.19 Further, the personnel carryover
between the Wilson and Harding administrations was minimal. The Repub-
licans retained few officials in senior, discretionary positions.20 Appointees
with set terms who could not be removed—e.g., commissioners serving in
independent regulatory bodies like the Federal Trade Commission—would
be replaced as their terms expired with others who shared the Republican
probusiness outlook.21
If associationalism were to become a cornerstone of national public pol-
icy, then, it would have to be created anew. Associationalist doctrine claimed
two important groups of supporters. First, a number of political figures, cor-
porate leaders, and intellectuals embraced the notion of a rationalized social
order organized on corporatist lines. They represented one wing of the Pro-
gressive movement, linked primarily to the Republican Party’s Bull Moose
faction. Like other Progressives, this group sought to check the predatory
exercise of power, especially economic power. But unlike the Wilsonian Pro-
gressives who viewed large corporate organizations as a danger that needed
to be countered through antitrust action or New Nationalists who wanted
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them placed under strong public supervision, the associationalists wanted
to preserve the benefits of corporations by enlisting them in cooperative
arrangements outside formal state control.22 Hoover emerged after 1920 as
the leading spokesperson for Republican associationalism, urging the orga-
nization of economic sectors into voluntary, self-governing associations to
promote economic efficiency, labor peace, and macroeconomic stability.23
Second, associationalism appealed to a bloc of business supporters who saw
the advantages of cooperation in producing a more stable business envi-
ronment. They had participated in the War Industries Board (WIB) struc-
ture during the war, profiting from the guaranteed demand and price-fixing
mechanism the board created, and had launched a short-lived movement to
eviscerate the Sherman Act when peace returned.24
However, we need to be careful lest we read too much into profes-
sions of business support for the associational approach. Firms and eco-
nomic sectors had interests in a wide range of public policies, including the
weakening of labor unions, lower personal and corporate taxes, and higher
tariffs on imports.25 To the degree that firms backed cooperative responses to
market turmoil, moreover, they often favored private or subnational public
solutions.26 If we conceive of businesses as having a preference ordering—
they favor any number of policies, but some are more central and/or more
readily attainable and thus become political priorities27—it is not clear that
associationalist governance under national auspices would rank high on
the list in the early 1920s. Certainly the evidence from Republican party
platforms and the legislative priorities of Republican Presidents Warren G.
Harding and Calvin Coolidge suggests that other policies mattered more.
Harding and Coolidge were unabashedly probusiness, yet, as we demon-
strate below, their backing for associationalism was tepid at best.
Restoration of Republican control over the policy making branches of
the national government may have spelled the end of Wilsonian approaches
at home and abroad, but what would follow remained uncertain. Republi-
cans were deeply divided. In addition to the longstanding split between the
Old Guard and Progressives, the bitter debate over the League of Nations
had left its mark on the party, while the worsening crisis in American agricul-
ture drove farm state Republicans to form an autonomous and often unruly
bloc. Some of these different factional divisions overlapped on the political
map, with Old Guard Republicans tending to come from eastern industrial
regions and Progressives cohering in the farm bloc.28 Even if the number of
major factions within the party reduces to only two, the fact remains that
Republicans found it very difficult to work together as a governing coalition
from 1921 onward. Simply put, the North-South core-periphery split that
distinguished the political system after 1896 gave way in the 1920s to an un-
stable three-sided sectional division, with the West acting as a political wild
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card throughout the decade.29 Leading eastern Republicans wanted to aid
their business constituents with higher tariffs and lower taxes intended to
promote investment. Absent farm bloc cooperation, however, a Republican
majority in Congress would be hard pressed to fulfill a legislative program
to satisfy policy seekers linked to the party.
With Congress divided and often deadlocked by intra-party disputes, the
locus of policy initiative would shift elsewhere—to the executive branch and
the courts. Harding and Coolidge were largely unknown quantities in 1921,
the former having been an obscure senator and the latter a little-known gov-
ernor from Massachusetts whose chief claim to fame (and to the party’s vice
presidential nomination) had been a strong stance against a Boston police
strike the previous year.30 There seemed little doubt, however, that Harding
stood closer to the party’s stand-pat wing than to the Progressives. As a gen-
eral proposition, conservative Old Guard Republicans looked askance at
associationalism because of its link to wartime mobilization and Wilson. To
further complicate the administrative picture, Democratic holdovers occu-
pied important positions that would let them shape economic policy in the
early years of Republican control. Of particular importance to the future
of business-government corporatist arrangements was the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC). With its members having been appointed entirely by
Wilson, the commission reflected his belief that business cooperation in-
vited collusion. The FTC had had its wings clipped by Congress in 1920
when it launched an aggressive investigation of the meat packing industry,
but it still remained a factor in economic policy and it continued to sup-
port vigorous antitrust enforcement in the early 1920s.31 Finally, the judicial
branch bore the imprint of different varieties of Progressivism in ways that
made its decisions difficult to predict.
ASSOCIATIONALISM IN LIMBO, 1921–1923
In the political context that framed the Republican return to power
in 1921, any possible resurrection of associationalist practices required a
strong champion. The leading spokesperson for corporatist arrangements
within Republican ranks was Herbert Hoover. As revisionists observe, his
entrepreneurial leadership of the Commerce Department was largely re-
sponsible for the creation of what revisionist scholars have come to label the
“associative state.” Eisner recounts how Hoover initially focused on building
the department’s capacity, drawing upon business leaders and reorganizing
the agency along lines suggested by the WIB, and then expanding the role
Commerce played in voluntary economic planning and in self-government
by economic sectors under its auspices.32 Though correct to a point, this
P1: Vendor
International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society [ijps] ph152-ijps-452810 October 1, 2002 19:7 Style file version Nov. 19th, 1999
Legacies Versus Politics 217
version of events leaves much out. Hoover’s position in Republican circles
was precarious; he did not enjoy the initial confidence of either Harding or
Coolidge33; and other domestic policy actors contained Hoover’s influence
very effectively in the Harding administration. Far from being a deliberate
first step in a long-term strategy to make Commerce the instrument of associ-
ationalist doctrine, Hoover’s initial moves reflected the defeat of his grander
aspirations at the hands of other political leaders.
When Hoover assumed control of the Commerce Department at the
outset of the Harding administration, his popularity with segments of the
public ranked higher than his political standing in Republican circles. He
had earned plaudits for his administration of relief efforts in Belgium at
the close of the war. From this had arisen a brief 1920 presidential trial
balloon. Hoover sought the Republican nomination, but he could not turn
his popularity into the kind of political strength required to prevail at the
convention.34 Harding emerged as the compromise party nominee and went
on to win over Democrat James M. Cox and assorted third-party candidates.35
The president elect hesitated before selecting Hoover for his cabinet because
of strong opposition among conservative party leaders. Yet Harding also did
not wish to become captive to the Old Guard, and he decided on Hoover as
a counterweight to conservative influence. To get the stand-patters to accept
Hoover, Harding tied his selection to that of Andrew Mellon, whom the Old
Guard wanted to install atop the Treasury Department.36
Hoover set out to make the Commerce Department an effective pol-
icy tool for implementing associationalist business-government coopera-
tion. He enlisted allies in the private sector, including Arch W. Shaw and
Robert Brookings (both veterans of the WIB), to help him refashion the
department37 and met with an advisory council created by the Chamber of
Commerce to set new goals.38 From Hoover’s meetings with the council,
a department agenda for economic stabilization soon emerged that rested
upon expansion of worldwide markets, improvement of national statistical
services, and elimination of waste in production. To foster improved trade,
the department needed to be restructured and enlarged. Hoover and his
business advisors persuaded Congress to support the reorganization and to
increase the department’s appropriation so it could add staff recruited from
export-oriented industries.39 Hoover also held that accurate economic infor-
mation would help businesses avoid destabilizing surpluses or shortages, and
the department accordingly began to publish a detailed monthly survey of
current business conditions. Reflecting another of his pet concerns—his con-
viction that excessive variety contributed to inefficiency and ultimately to
unemployment40—Hoover also initiated programs to reduce waste in indus-
try. A new Division of Simplified Practices organized standardization com-
mittees in different industries and organized conferences with manufacturers
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to develop industry-specific simplification plans that the Commerce Depart-
ment would use as the basis for official recommendations and voluntary
producer compliance.41 The dynamic and imaginative Hoover of revisionist
accounts emerges clearly in the steps he took to remake the department.
Without the backing of other governing institutions, however, Hoover
could not expect to take his ideas very far. Congress proved to be a major
obstacle. Following the September 1921 President’s Unemployment Confer-
ence held at Hoover’s initiative, he accepted the principle that the national
government could support economic stability through countercyclical public
works spending.42 A bill introduced later that year by Iowa Senator William
Kenyon sought to direct the heads of executive departments to advise the
president on the expansion or contraction of public works based upon infor-
mation published monthly by the Commerce Department.43 Despite support
from both business and organized labor, the measure was blocked by south-
ern Democrats.44 Bills designed to link federal public works to the condition
of the economy resurfaced from time to time over the course of the next
decade but never mustered congressional majorities.45 (See Table 2.) Hoover
fared no better during the Harding years with legislation that would expand
the regulatory authority of the Commerce Department over emerging eco-
nomic sectors. Congress did not approve bills that would let the department
regulate radio broadcast licenses or commercial aviation.46
Hoover’s determination to make his department the center of domes-
tic policy initiatives in the new administration also invited conflict with
other cabinet members and their agencies. Some department heads caved
in before his imperial ambitions.47 Others, though, held different policy
views and enjoyed advantages Hoover found difficult to overcome, includ-
ing close personal ties to the president or powerful political constituencies.
Foremost among Hoover’s foes within the administration were Attorney
General Harry M. Daugherty and Agriculture Secretary Henry C. Wallace.
Daugherty, a longtime friend of the president and his 1920 presidential cam-
paign manager, comes across in historical accounts as an Ohio political fixer
of dubious ethics, a characterization consistent with his political demise amid
the scandals that followed Harding’s death.48 Yet the attorney general was
also an official with strong conservative policy views who had the presi-
dent’s ear, displayed a keen sensitivity to the political winds that Hoover
lacked, and occupied an institutional position that permitted him to thwart
Hoover’s program. Wallace had a reputation as a moderate Progressive who,
while editing an Iowa paper with a farm audience, had antagonized pack-
ing and food-processing interests. He would serve as the principal voice of
distressed farmers within the administration and would lend his support to
agriculture policies very different from those Hoover endorsed. Given the
pivotal role of the farm bloc in Congress as the margin that could make or
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Table 2. The Failure of Countercyclical Public Works Proposals in the 1920s
Proposed legislation Outcome
67th Congress, 1921–1923
To prepare for future cyclical
periods of depression and
unemployment by a system of
public works. (S. 2749, H. R.
10353)
Debated in Senate, amended, and returned to
Committee on Education and Labor. House
bill referred to Committee on Labor. No final
floor vote.
To investigate national need for
public works by federal, state, and
municipal agencies in periods of
business depression and
unemployment. (S. 4472, H. R.
14185)
Reported from Senate Committee on Education
and Labor and House Committee on Labor.
No final floor vote.
68th Congress, 1923–1925
To investigate national need for
public works by federal, state, and
municipal agencies in periods of
business depression and
unemployment. (S. 2543)
Referred to Senate Committee on Education and
Labor.
69th Congress, 1925–1927
To investigate national need for
public works by federal, state, and
municipal agencies in periods of
business depression and
unemployment. (S. 981, H. R.
4546)
Referred to Senate Committee on Education and
Labor and House Committee on Labor.
70th Congress, 1927–1929
To create a prosperity reserve and
stabilize industry and
employment by expansion of
public works during periods of
unemployment and industrial
depression. (S. 2475, H. R. 13568)
Debated in the Senate; no final floor vote. House
bill referred to Committee on the Judiciary.
To provide for emergency
construction of public works for
relief of unemployment during
periods of business depression.
(S. 4307)
Referred to Senate Committee on Education and
Labor
Source: Congressional Record, vol. 61–70.
break any Republican majority, Wallace would be a powerful force in the
cabinet. These officials could impede and even undo the work Hoover was
doing at the Commerce Department or steer the administration toward a
very different policy course from the one he envisioned. (Though of less
direct concern to our argument, which focuses on Hoover’s associationalist
program, he also collided at times with Treasury Secretary Mellon and Sec-
retary of State Charles Evans Hughes.49 Further, outside the cabinet itself,
Hoover after 1923 often met sharp opposition from Benjamin Strong and
other Federal Reserve Board leaders.50)
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At the core of associationalist doctrine lay a benign view of business
cooperation through trade associations that, as Hoover soon learned the
hard way, other agencies and influential political actors did not share. Here
we must take a short step backward in time. Before the Wilson adminis-
tration left office, its appointees began to question the role of trade asso-
ciations in stimulating postwar inflation. The Federal Trade Commission in
1919 challenged the legality of open-price associations—trade groups that
shared detailed information about prices for current (and sometimes future)
transactions, with an understanding that prices would not be changed with-
out prior notice to competitors.51 Prodded by the FTC, A. Mitchell Palmer,
Wilson’s attorney general, criticized open-price associations as instruments
for price-fixing and began legal action against several such groups, most no-
tably the Hardwood Lumber Manufacturer’s Association. The legal threat
to trade groups was not confined to the national level. In New York, an
investigative committee established by the state legislature enlisted noted
attorney Samuel Untermyer as counsel to assist an inquiry into the building
trades industry. By late 1920 he had attracted much publicity with charges of
nationwide price-fixing arrangements, and he used his press contacts to em-
barrass Palmer and force him to subordinate the federal antitrust litigation
to his state committee.52
The change in administration would silence neither Untermyer nor the
FTC, a fact that incoming Attorney General Daugherty grasped more read-
ily than did Hoover. After being rebuffed by the new commerce secretary,
who declined to support tighter regulation of trade associations at the na-
tional level,53 Untermyer next sought Daugherty’s support. He proved more
receptive, not only because of his more conservative outlook on economic
cooperation but also because he appreciated the political damage that could
be done to the administration by charges it was indifferent to price fixing
schemes or, worse, actually promoted them. An early sign of what to ex-
pect came from the FTC, which still had a Democratic majority and which
remained unchastened by the congressional reaction to its inquiry into the
food processing industry. Asked by President Harding shortly after his in-
auguration to explain why during the current recession consumer prices did
not decline along with the prices of food and raw materials, the FTC in a pub-
lished letter pointed to the role that open-price associations played in main-
taining prices.54 Harding picked up the theme in his April 12th message to
Congress. He voiced his concern about high consumer prices and wondered
whether these were the consequence of “‘open-price associations,’ which op-
erate, evidently, within the law, to the very great advantage of their members
and equal disadvantage to the consuming public.”55 Even before the speech,
Daugherty had met with Untermyer to promise vigorous antitrust action.
This took the form of a broad-ranging federal litigation campaign against
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open-price associations. Within months federal civil litigation and criminal
prosecutions had placed trade associations on the defensive and had set the
Justice Department at odds with Hoover and the Commerce Department.56
The hand of the Justice Department was soon strengthened by another
institutional player, the Supreme Court. In December 1921 the Court handed
up a decision in favor of the government in the hardwood trade group case
that had commenced under the Wilson administration.57 Although no ex-
plicit agreements on prices or production levels were reached within the
lumber association, the Court held that the actions of the group constituted
an unlawful restraint of trade: “Genuine competitors do not make daily,
weekly, and monthly reports of the minutest details of their business to their
rivals.” In the view of the Court, the purpose of the association’s activities
was “to restrict production and increase prices.”58 Initially, Daugherty and
his Antitrust Division head Guy E. Goff were inclined to regard the decision
as a virtual prohibition of open-price associations, though other antitrust and
trade association lawyers held the language in the opinion was not so definite.
After complaints from businesses and following discussions with Hoover,
Daugherty settled in February 1922 for an intermediate and conditional po-
sition. He approved the collection of information by trade associations and
its full, public circulation by the Commerce Department, provided that such
interchanges did not lead to price-fixing. As Robert F. Himmelberg observes,
the attorney general reserved the prerogative of rescinding the trade group
rights he had conceded and thus left associationalists uncertain about what
they would be allowed to do.59
Political forces ultimately led Daugherty to revive the sweeping at-
tack on trade associations. Business interests, as events soon made evident,
were poorly organized to pursue revisions in the antitrust statutes and no
political leader stepped forward to assume the burden of broad business
mobilization.60 Senator Walter Edge, a New Jersey Republican, introduced
legislation that merely sought to clarify the grey area between legal and ille-
gal association activity. Yet even with such a moderate measure and height-
ened business concern about runaway antitrust enforcement, Edge could
not overcome the divisions among trade groups and ultimately gave up in
frustration. He complained to Hoover that “the representatives of trade as-
sociations that have called on me are so divided in their view point that I
have simply permitted the matter to drift.”61 On the other side of the ledger,
Daugherty felt pressure from those who thought his agreement with Hoover
and the Justice Department’s cautious approach represented unacceptable
backsliding toward legitimizing cartels. Untermyer reappeared with charges
that Daugherty had shied away from prosecution of antitrust cases against
firms with Republican ties. The accusations became the substantive basis for
hearings by the House Judiciary Committee in late 1922 on a resolution to
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impeach the attorney general for lax antitrust enforcement.62 Underscoring
the political vulnerability of the administration, Republicans lost much of
their congressional majority in the off-year election, with the greatest losses
coming from the ranks of probusiness party regulars in the eastern states.63
Daugherty concluded that a strong stance against trade associations was the
safer political course and he directed his subordinates accordingly. The net
effect of Justice Department enforcement, court rulings, and publicity dur-
ing the Harding era was the reduced formation of trade groups between
1920 and 1924 by comparison with the preceding and following five-year
periods.64
Hoover and Daugherty clashed in another policy area important to
associationalism, labor relations, and again the attorney general prevailed. In
Hoover’s vision of associational cooperation, organized labor would assume
a constructive role as a junior partner in voluntary, corporatist arrangements
intended to foster commonality of purpose between business and labor.65
His conciliatory approach stood sharply at odds with Daugherty’s frankly
reactionary view that strikes represented illegal combinations that should
be fought through injunctions. (Neither view, it should be noted, reflected
majority Republican sentiment at the time, which emphasized state oversight
of labor to keep its power well in check.66) When several railroad unions went
on strike in 1922, Hoover sought to negotiate a settlement between the two
sides while Daugherty, who believed the workers were led by communists,
urged strong repressive action. Secretary of Labor James J. Davis negotiated
a possible settlement that offered the workers little, but it was the railroad
managers who rejected the deal despite an appeal from Hoover. At that
point President Harding gave up any pretense of neutrality and directed
Daugherty to take whatever steps he deemed necessary, including the use of
force, to end the strike. Even though it was already unraveling due to a lack
of support from other unions and the uncompromising management stance,
the attorney general obtained a harsh injunction that antagonized organized
labor.67
Tensions also beset Hoover’s relations with Agriculture Secretary
Wallace. Both men were bureaucratic empire-builders and they collided
over which agency would deal with the commercial side of agriculture.68 For
instance, when Nebraska Senator George W. Norris introduced a farm relief
bill that would create a public export corporation to dispose of farm sur-
pluses, Hoover rejected it as excessive government interference in business
while Wallace opposed it primarily because the corporation would have been
chaired by the commerce secretary.69 Apart from the bureaucratic stakes
(and the apparent personal hostility Hoover’s poaching provoked), the two
also parted ways on the appropriate policy to address postwar farm prob-
lems. Initially the differences were not pronounced. For example, a January
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1922 farm conference controlled by Wallace yielded a set of very moderate
proposals that included some associationalist initiatives. One proposal led
to the Capper-Volstead Act, which gave legal protection to farm coopera-
tives that trade associations could only envy.70 But where Hoover regarded
himself as a visionary economic modernizer, Wallace adopted a pragmatic
approach designed to offer farmers whatever aid might be of use in pre-
serving their economic status and ignored ideological considerations when
these got in the way. As it became clear that farmers were not sharing in
the general economic recovery of the Harding years, the policy conflicts
between Hoover and Wallace widened. Wallace’s close friendship with the
president and his ties to a powerful group of lawmakers helped him neutral-
ize Hoover. For instance, against objections by Hoover, Wallace convinced
Harding to support a conference proposal for preferential railroad freight
rates for farmers.71
The principal difference between the two department heads involved
how to deal with overproduction in agriculture. Hoover believed that rapid
advances in agricultural productivity should be addressed through cooper-
ative controls over production to limit output and, in the long run, by the
exodus of surplus farmers from the agricultural sector. By contrast, the agri-
culture secretary concluded that direct subsidies for farmers were essential,
since they could not effectively control output and tie it to market condi-
tions. At the 1922 conference participants discussed—but did not endorse—a
scheme to restore agricultural price parity to prewar levels. The plan called
for preserving the 1914 price ratio between farm commodities and industrial
commodities in the domestic market by selling agricultural surpluses abroad
at lower prices through a government agency. Republican farm policy at that
point rejected direct price supports for farmers, however, so the proposal was
tabled. It would be taken up by Senator Charles L. McNary of Oregon and
Iowa Representative Gilbert N. Haugen, and McNary-Haugenism would
become the source of fierce contention between farm bloc lawmakers and
Republican chief executives.72 Wallace recognized the inadequacy of ad-
ministration policy and lent his backing to the subsidy plan in 1923. When
Coolidge succeeded to the presidency and was distracted by scandals and
election concerns, the Agriculture Department helped frame the first ver-
sion of the McNary-Haugen bill.73 Once again Hoover found himself out-
flanked by another agency, with control over the agenda passing to his policy
competitors in Congress.
When taken as a whole, the Harding period offers few policy outcomes
that can be explained by any of the policy legacy frameworks. The hostility
of most leading policy makers to the associationalist agenda, the legislative
defeats Hoover suffered when he sought to extend Commerce authority to
new industries or to expand federal macroeconomic management, and the
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decline in the rate of trade group formation are the exact opposite of what
we would anticipate if wartime corporatism had left behind a thick legacy.
Some evidence indicates that systemic constraints hindered the push for a
weak law to make clear what trade associations could do—Senator Edge
was thwarted when trade groups could not overcome their collective action
dilemma. Yet the pattern of Hoover’s legislative losses points to the greater
explanatory significance of partisan factional tensions. A discursive legacy
from the war did continue to influence policy debate, aided by Hoover’s good
press and his vigorous promotion of the theme of voluntary public-private
cooperation. Corporatist thinking, however, had little impact on what the
national government did because many key positions in all branches were
occupied by policymakers who subscribed to different schools of thought.
CHANCE EVENTS, PARTISAN STALEMATE,
AND THE APPEARANCE OF SUCCESS
Developments after Harding’s death in 1923 created an opening for ad-
vocates of associationalism and increased its visibility. Leading opponents
of Hoover’s ideas abruptly left the scene due to scandal or death in the first
year of the Coolidge administration. Their replacements often were Hoover
proteges. Just as important, the ongoing stalemate between Republican fac-
tions continued to impede legislative action. In the face of congressional
inaction, President Coolidge realized that Hoover could be a useful instru-
ment for signaling administration commitments to important Republican
constituencies. The forward march of associationalism, in other words, re-
flected a combination of chance events and partisan calculation—not the al-
lure of corporatist ideas or the growing power of a proassociationalist policy
network.
Both of Hoover’s leading cabinet antagonists were gone by the end of
1924. Although Daugherty aspired to play the same role for Coolidge that
he had for Harding, the two men did not have a similar personal associa-
tion. Whatever prospects the attorney general had for retaining influence
quickly vanished as he became embroiled in the controversies that arose
after Harding’s death. Daugherty had acted as an informal sponsor for Jesse
Smith and came under a cloud when the latter was implicated in a scan-
dal that led to his suicide. Some accounts indicate that Daugherty became
emotionally unstable amid the investigations and revelations, while others
suggest leading Republican lawmakers demanded his removal.74 Either way,
Coolidge decided his attorney general had become a political liability and
forced him to resign. Daugherty was replaced with Harlan Stone, who co-
operated with Hoover in the preparation of a test case to elicit from the
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courts a more permissive interpretation of the Sherman Act.75 Another sig-
nificant change at the Justice Department saw the appointment of William
J. Donovan to head the Antitrust Division. In sharp contrast with the pol-
icy under Goff, Donovan applied a “rule of reason” standard that accepted
price fixing when the economic benefits justified such practices.76 Agriculture
Secretary Wallace died in the summer of 1924, and his successor, William M.
Jardine, was a Hoover man (after Hoover himself declined the position).77
Within the space of a few months, then, Hoover found himself with allies
rather than adversaries in the highest reaches of the administration.
Threats to the associationalist agenda from other institutional players
also subsided in the mid-1920s. To begin with, Republican efforts to remake
the independent regulatory agencies also bore fruit under Coolidge. The
appointment of William E. Humphrey as FTC chairman in 1925 resulted in
a Republican majority openly sympathetic to business. As Eisner notes, the
new chairman acted swiftly to revise FTC procedures in such a way as to
preclude effective antitrust action. No longer would businesses need to fear
that the exchange of information or other forms of cooperation would incur
the commission’s wrath. Indeed, to the contrary, the FTC began to organize
industry conferences to define the rules of competition and to enforce those
rules against firms that deviated from them.78 The Supreme Court in Maple
Flooring Manufacturer’s Association v. United States (1925) also clarified its
stance on trade association activity in a way that relieved much of the anxiety
such groups had felt since the 1921 decision and the subsequent restrictive
interpretation pursued by Daugherty’s Justice Department. The Court raised
no objection when association meetings did not discuss prices or output and
the resulting prices members charged were not uniform.79
As the personnel changes and shift in judicial doctrine removed imped-
iments to associationalism, partisan divisions in Congress made Hoover’s
approach more attractive to President Coolidge. The obstructionist tactics
of farm state lawmakers rendered GOP control over the legislative branch
ever more precarious.80 By 1926 the party retained the power to organize the
Senate only because of deals GOP leaders made with insurgents. Since the ar-
rangement did not extend to agreement on substantive matters, Republicans
could do little to shape the legislative agenda.81 Coolidge consequently saw
most of his legislative proposals buried by Congress. Indicative of his diffi-
culties is the fate of a tax cut proposal that the president put before Congress
in March 1924 with an eye on the approaching election. Treasury Secretary
Mellon wanted to reduce the maximum income surtax from 50% to 25% and
repeal the 25% estate tax, measures designed to spur higher-risk investments
by high income earners. Instead, Congress approved a smaller reduction in
the surtax (to 40%) and raised the estate tax to 40%, effectively neutralizing
any benefit wealthy—and Republican—taxpayers might have received.82
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Meanwhile, the farm bloc continued to press its own agenda at odds
with that of the administration. Although Wallace had died, his influence
continued through McNary-Haugenism. Its proponents proved themselves
adroit at coalition building in Congress: by extending the program to cover
cotton, they attracted strong Democratic support from the South. Twice they
mustered congressional majorities in favor of farm subsidy legislation, which
Coolidge in turn vetoed because he rejected the notion that the national gov-
ernment should keep failing farms afloat (his unsentimental view) or that
it needed to preserve a balance between agrarian society and the relent-
less march of industry (as proponents saw it).83 The bipartisan and cross-
sectional alliance also made its weight felt in the protracted battles over the
proposal to develop the Muscle Shoals fertilizer and power-generating fa-
cilities in Alabama under public auspices. Southern Democrats conditioned
their backing for McNary-Haugen on farm-state Republican support for
Muscle Shoals, only to be blocked again by Coolidge.84 With the South-West
farm program thwarted by the White House, the farm bloc reciprocated
by impeding legislative action on other measures central to the industrial
Republican program. Only minor legislation, including weakened versions
of the commercial aviation and radio industry regulatory measures Hoover
had been pushing since the early 1920s, secured passage.85
An astute politician, especially where his own political future was at
stake, Coolidge recognized the need to build a strong probusiness record.
Here lay Hoover’s political value to the president. Although Coolidge
evinced no particular enthusiasm for Hoover’s ideas, the commerce sec-
retary had a knack for attracting positive publicity. What he could offer, in
short, was the appearance of doing something, a political necessity for the
party when actual accomplishments had become impossible.86 The public-
ity Hoover generated for his associationalist program thus became an end
in itself.
The political imperative of demonstrating symbolic support for the con-
cerns of policy seekers linked to the GOP explains one of the more striking
features of Hoover’s tenure at the Commerce Department. Some revision-
ists see the 1920s as a period of reform, but it would be more accurate to
call it one of reform talk—the “Conference Decade.” The precedent was
set in Harding’s first months, when he approved high-profile conferences
on unemployment and the farm crisis. Coolidge found it prudent to en-
courage similar conclaves, including an agriculture conference in February
1924.87 The sessions, often organized by Hoover, drew together leading in-
tellectuals, businessmen, labor leaders, and politicians. Many proposals were
developed, recommendations for legislative action issued, and reports com-
piled. That so many meetings yielded so few real results hardly mattered,
for the conferences gave the administration the political cover it required.
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Although Hoover believed strongly in the associationalist remedies that
his conferences and commissions urged, Coolidge was content, Robert H.
Ferrell argues, with the image of concern.88 For example, when speaking to
a business audience in late 1925, the president singled out the activities of
the Commerce Department (without mentioning its head by name) as a key
element in the nation’s recent economic prosperity.89
The impact of the scandals that came to light after Harding’s death and
the adroit political use of associationalism by his successor seem to have mis-
led at least one scholar. Eisner considers it remarkable that Teapot Dome
and other examples of public corruption did not doom business-government
cooperation of the sort Hoover advocated. “That such scandals did not fore-
close associationalism as an option,” he asserts, “stands as a testament to
the power of the wartime legacy and Hoover’s advocacy.”90 But this conclu-
sion misses the more obvious effect of the scandals: they helped remove the
most determined opponents of associationalism, notably Daugherty, whose
hostility to that point had effectively checked the associationalist project.
Moreover, while Hoover was certainly relentless in agitating for voluntary
self-regulation of business under the oversight of the Commerce Depart-
ment, much of what he did served Coolidge’s symbolic purposes. We need
to be cautious about reading too much into gestures. Though they may con-
tribute to a discursive inheritance, they do not make for a thick bequest that
imposes real obligations on later officeholders. Initiatives in associational-
ism during the 1920s can be better appreciated, then, as Republicans (others
than Hoover) saw them: stopgap measures to satisfy core regime supporters
in the business community when more substantial policies were blocked by
divisions within the party coalition.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing account leads us to both empirical and theoretical con-
clusions. On the empirical side, the evidence cannot sustain the revisionist
policy legacy perspectives as the best framework for understanding the pe-
riod between the First World War and the onset of the Great Depression
in 1929. Least defensible is a thick legacy account grounded in the contin-
ued influence of wartime mobilization. The swift dismantling of the mobi-
lization apparatus, its discredited status in the eyes of Republicans, their
incentive-oriented views of how to promote economic recovery and growth,
and the stalled associationalist program under Harding belie claims that mo-
bilization continued to enthrall key national policy makers. We suggest Ellis
Hawley is closer to the mark when he depicts associationalists in the early
1920s as “keepers of the flame,” often reduced to wandering in the political
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wilderness.91 They did nourish a corporatist discursive legacy. Yet such a
legacy explains little about what happened in the Harding-Coolidge era.
To understand central policy debates and outcomes, including the blocked
Republican legislative agenda and the furious battles over McNary-Haugen
and Muscle Shoals, we need to look elsewhere. Similarly, to dwell upon sys-
temic constraints on the national government does not take us far because
policy makers during the 1920s rarely tested the limits of the system. Even
the very real collective action problems faced by many business sectors did
not often shape national policy debates.
A better starting point for understanding policy patterns in the years
after the First World War may be found in partisan politics, especially in the
intra-partisan dynamics of the restored but fragile Republican governing
coalition. Partisanship accounts for the dismantling of mobilization agen-
cies and the purge of senior government personnel, for the failure to enact
tax cuts or measures to tie public works spending to the business cycle,
and for the defeat of various regulatory measures. At the same time, the
deep fractures within the Republican party that led to legislative stalemate
also left President Coolidge with political needs that gave Hoover and his
fellow associationalists a modest opening. They were useful to others, but
hardly powerful in their own right. Through the partisan context we also en-
counter the one systemic constraint that mattered in the 1920s—the sectional
character of the American political economy. This had a powerful impact
by turning many key policy debates into three-sided battles with no stable
majority solution.
From our empirical findings we draw certain theoretical conclusions
about the limited value of policy legacy perspectives. Thin legacies (dis-
cursive networks or systemic constraints) tend to under-explain outcomes.
When the participants in a discursive network do not occupy key policy po-
sitions, their ideas have limited impact and will likely be made to serve the
agendas of other political actors.92 By the same token, mainstream politi-
cal leaders do not often choose to push against the accepted boundaries of
the American political system. Cultural and constitutional limits usually do
not enter into the actual political calculus in which leaders engage. Thick
legacy accounts suffer from other faults, notably a tendency toward tunnel
vision. Scholars eager to demonstrate the power of carryovers may pro-
duce “lawyer’s brief” policy history – one-sided narratives that identify and
amplify evidence of policy inheritance while ignoring everything else. The
picture that results is unbalanced, for it neglects the other political dynamics
that are at play. Certainly no account of policy outcomes can be complete
that ignores the political forces shaping the major policymaking institutions.
These forces, including partisan coalitions, the impact of legislative rules, the
proximity of national elections to a decision, and more, tend to be slighted
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when discursive conventions and informal public-private networks are thrust
into the foreground.
The policy legacy construct also induces scholars to overlook another
political dynamic, the role of contingency—chance events and choices by
key actors—in shaping policy development. No theory can anticipate spe-
cific chance events, of course, but a framework should not lead us to overlook
their possible importance. We believe the policy legacy framework, preoc-
cupied with continuity, directs attention away from happenstance. It is no
accident that pivotal events that loom large in our account, such as the deaths
of President Harding or Agriculture Secretary Wallace, scarcely figure in the
thick legacy story of the interwar years. Political choice also matters more
than legacy explanations appreciate. Even were we to build a legacy analysis
of the 1920s around sectionalism as a systemic constraint, the explanation
would be radically incomplete. It would leave out a host of political choices
with far-reaching consequences for the political economy of the early inter-
war period: Harding decided to include Hoover in his cabinet to demonstrate
his independence from the party’s Old Guard; Harding selected Daugherty
and Wallace; the conservative Daugherty agreed to work with the flam-
boyant Progressive Untermyer; Coolidge opted to retain Hoover despite
his personal feelings about the holdover commerce secretary; and Coolidge
chose to appoint Hoover men to a number of key posts. Not one of these
decisions was compelled by the sectional tensions plaguing the GOP.
We do not suggest that policy bequests have no influence upon the
course of policy development. But the revisionist literature on the 1920s
points to the limits of legacy explanations. We need policy history that
pays close attention to core institutions like Congress, the presidency, and
parties. We need policy history that grapples with chance and choice, not that
brushes them aside. Any explanation of policy development that
neglects such things is too thin, no matter how thick it tries to be.
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